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Educational tracking is a very controversial issue in education. The tracking debate is about the virtues of 
uniformity and vertical differentiation in the curriculum and teaching. The pro-tracking group claims that 
curriculum and teaching better aimed at children's varied interest and skills will foster learning efficacy. The 
anti-tracking group claims that tracking systems are inefficient and unfair because they hinder learning and 
distribute learning inequitably.  In this paper we provide a detailed within-country analysis of a specific 
educational system with a long history of early educational tracking between schools, namely the Flemish 
secondary school system in Belgium. This is interesting place to look because it provides a remarkable mix of 
excellence and inequality. Indeed the Flemish school system is repeatedly one of the best performer in the 
international harmonized PISA tests in math, science and reading; whereas it produces some of the most 
unequal distributions of learning between schools and students.  Combining evidence from the PISA 2006 
data set at the student and school level with recent statistical methods, we show first the dramatic impact of 
tracking  on  social  segregation;  and  then,  the  impact  of  social  segregation  on  equality  of  educational 
opportunity (adequately measured). It is shown that tracking, via social segregation, has a major effect on 
inequality of opportunity.  Children of different economic classes will have different access to knowledge. 
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`What is tracking?'
Tracking is the grouping of students into classes by ability/prior achievements and organizing
curriculum by its level of diculty. Track assignments are based on successful completion of
prerequisite courses, prior achievements, and teacher recommendations (The tracking decision
is no longer based on IQ test as in the past in the US). But still tracking remains a very con-
troversial issue. Pro-tracking groups claim that students at dierent levels of ability require
dierent types of instruction. `Expecting all children the same age to learn from the same
materials is like expecting all children the same age to wear the same size clothing.'(Madeline
Hunter). Opponents of tracking have argued that high achieving students serve as role mod-
els for less able, struggling students. In truth, tracking is a very divisive and complex issue
involving some fundamental equity /eciency trade os as well described in Tom Loveless
(1999) `The Tracking Wars'. Following Loveless (1999), there is much confusion in the de-
bate simply because tracking is a practice that means dierent things to dierent people. It
is indeed useful to distinguish tracking from ability grouping. Both systems denote the prac-
tice of grouping students of similar ability or prior achievement together for instruction. In
this report, we adhere to the conventional denitions employed by researchers, using \ability
grouping" to refer to the grouping of students by ability within classes with uniform cur-
riculum for all, which is primarily an elementary school practice, and \tracking" to refer to
the grouping of students by ability between classes with dierentiated curriculum, a strategy
common in middle and high schools. The tracks cover distinctly dierent curricula across
subjects, and lead to dierent destinations upon graduation. Three tracks are common: (1)
a high track, with college-preparatory or honors courses that prepare students for admission
to top colleges and universities; (2) a middle track that served as a catch-all for the group of
students in the middle, and (3) a low track, consisting of vocational courses and a smattering
of low-level academic oerings, serving mainly low functioning and indierent students. After
graduation, low track students frequently drop out, go to work, or get unemployed.
`Why it is unpopular?'
One of the main reasons that tracking has become unpopular has less to do with the outcomes
the practice generates than with the types of students who tend to be assigned to the dierent
tracks. A major concern is that tracking is used to segregate students on the basis of family
background and race, as well as ability. In fact, the primary charges against tracking are (i)
that it doesn't accomplish anything and (ii) that it unfairly creates unequal opportunities for
academic achievement. This critique has fueled in the 90's with the very inuential book by
Anne Wheelock (1992), `Crossing the Tracks. How Untracking Can Save America's Schools'.
2`What is the evidence?'
Generally speaking, research fails to produce conclusive evidence. Loveless (1999) reports a
large set of empirical research comparing tracking and non-tracking systems based on the US
National Education Longitudinal Study started in 1988. When students are ability grouped
into separate classes and given an identical curriculum, there is no appreciable eect on
achievement. However when the curriculum is adjusted to better match ability level, it ap-
pears that student achievement is boosted, especially for high ability students receiving an
accelerated curriculum, but that low ability students may suer from assignment to lower
tracks.1 To sum up, heterogeneous classes appear to benet low ability students, but may
depress the achievement of average and high achieving students. The central diculty with
such non-experimental evidence is the identication problem: it is almost impossible to iden-
tify the causal eect of school tracking on pupils' achievement because of selection bias. We
could observe a positive peer group eect simply because those forming the same group share
similar unobserved characteristics (selection eect), and not because there is some positive
social interaction (incentive eect). This is called the reection problem by reference to the
co-movement between a person and his image in a mirror.2 Does the group reect your own
image, or do you match the image of the group? With random selection the eective impact of
a treatment can be identied. It is the reason why randomized experiments are so valuable to
evaluate policy impact. So far there is few experimental evidence on tracking and its impact
on education outcomes. The main exceptions are Duo et al. (2009) for primary education in
Kenya where there is random assignment of pupils (grade 1) and teachers among 60 tracking
and 61 non-tracking schools and Guyon et al. (2010) for secondary education in Northern
Ireland where there is discontinuity in the share of pupils in elite-schools across cohorts and
across regions. In the random assignment of Duo et al. (2009), in tracking schools, students
were ranked by prior achievements and the top and bottom halves were assigned to dierent
classes. They found that students in tracking schools scored 0.14 standard deviation higher
on average, regardless of their initial score. They argued that greater homogeneity in the
classroom allowed teachers to tailor their teaching to what the student can learn, and this
dierentiation benets everyone including those assigned to the bottom classes. Obviously
the diculty is to extend this potential (experimental) benet for the lower-achieving pupils
of a teaching more appropriate to them in a more general (non-experimental) context where
teaching dierentiation can promote segregation and create unequal opportunities. In con-
trast to the Duo et al. (2009) experiment, Guyon et al. (2010) nd evidence against the
1See also Rees et al. (1996)
2(Manski, 1993)
3eciency argument from tracking. Using cohort data from Northern Ireland as a natural
experiment, they show via a discontinuity regression approach that there is a signicant pos-
itive net-eect on educational outcomes of the `de-tracking' refrom in 1989. In addition, the
authors nd clear evidence for a positive association between the area-level variation of the
share of pupils in elite schools and the proportion of successful students at age 16 and 18.
`Social segregation'
Tracking, to be sure, links a student's present and past track level. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, if past academic achievement is related to parental background, then tracking will
link present track to family background. As a result, students may be placed in low tracks
because of the socio-economic status of their family.3 If we believe that teaching follows a
hierarchical sequence, exposing students to increasingly dicult skills and complex knowl-
edge, early tracking can lock in students with low socio-economic background in low tracks
and induce progressive segregation. The consequence is unequal access to knowledge. This is
getting worse, as evidence seems to suggest, if low tracks attracts less experienced teachers
and hinders the motivation and aspiration of students with lower expectations; and if parents
intervention into tracking decision is more common with highly educated parents pushing for
high track placements. This is where unequal opportunities comes into the debate.
School choice
Educational track








Figure 1: School tracking and inequality of opportunity
3PIRLS 2006 displays clearly strong correlation between early reading literacy (grade 4) and parental
education in all countries (chapter 3, exhibit 3.5, pp120-121).
4`What is our contribution?'
A rst contribution of this paper is to estimate the eect of systematic school tracking on social
segregation in schooling. In Duo et al. (2009), educational tracking is studied without atten-
tion to social segregation because of the random assignment of students and sta to dierent
treatment groups. In non experimental contexts, many more eects come in. Educational
tracking can lead to racial and class bias in track assignment with curriculum dierentiation,
dierence in teacher experience and quality, dierence in resources, and dierence in students
expectations and motivations.
To investigate empirically the link between school tracking and social segregation, we study
systematic `between-school' tracking as is implemented extensively in among others Belgium,
Hungary, Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany. Pupils are sorted
in general (high), technical-arts (middle) and vocational (low {track) study programmes based
on prior achievements, with almost no probability to have lessons together with pupils from
dierent tracks and almost no possibility to share the same teachers. Each track has its own
curriculum and end goals. Most schools organize only one track so that pupils in dierent
tracks are in dierent schools. There is almost no upward track mobility.
This is clearly dierent from `within-school' tracking as discussed in Duo et al. (2009) and
is the case in among others the US4. We focus on the Flemish community of Belgium (Flan-
ders), which has a long tradition of educational tracking at the age of 12 (grade 7). This
is interesting place to look at because it combines high average achievements (repeatedly in
the top of international PISA Tests in Math, Science and Reading) with extensive achieve-
ments inequality between schools and between students (bottom in the international PISA
test variances). Belgium is also a country that displays very extensive social segregation in
education (see Jenkins et al. (2008)). Using Hutchens decomposition method, we show that
most of social segregation in the Flemish community takes place between tracks. It is also
shown that the private/public school dimension has little impact on social segregation.
Secondly, by linking school tracking to social segregation, we can indirectly measure the eect
of school tracking on educational opportunities in a cross-sectional microlevel study. We adopt
recent empirical methods with strong theoretical underpinnings to study how school tracking
aects equality of opportunity in schooling via social segregation. We estimate the existence
of inequality of opportunity in schooling by comparing conditional (on socio-economic status)
distributions of test scores and by estimating the `Gini opportunity' index as in Lefranc et al.
(2008). Then, the determinants of inequality of opportunity are investigated in a multilevel
regression approach that is closely related to Bourguignon et al. (2007). This multilevel
4Within-school tracking is discussed in among others Epple et al. (2002), Figlio and Page (2002).
5regression analysis relates the test score of students to the social composition of the school
and the socio-economic status of students. To accommodate the hierarchical clustering of
pupils in schools, we include random school eects as well a a specic random individual
eect. We complement this conditional mean regression analysis, with a broader conditional
quantile regression analysis to see how not only the mean of the distribution, but also the
full distribution is aected (possibly dierently) by the family background and the school
composition. Explicit considerations of these eects via quantile regression can provide a
more nuanced view of the stochastic relationship between socio-economic variables and test
scores and therefore a more informative empirical analysis. Results show that school tracking
has via social segregation a profound eect on inequality of opportunity in schooling. The
quantile regression analysis reveals that the social composition of school is the main inuence
on the conditional quartiles of test scores. This means that students with the same family
background achieve signicantly dierent test score threshold depending with whom they go
to school.
2 Related literature
Recent empirical research has shown the importance of educational achievements for (1)
individual earnings, (2) the distribution of income, and (3) economic growth (Barro, 2001;
Bishop, 1992; Nickell, 2004; Hanushek and W omann, 2008). As a result, the issue of equal
earnings opportunities is closely related to equal educational opportunities (Brunello and
Checchi, 2007). Understanding the drivers of equal opportunities in education is thus a
major issue. Since the Coleman (1966) report, the impact of family background and peer
eects on the quality of education has been investigated in a wide range of literature. Using
data from respectively the US and Brazil, Betts and Roemer (2005) and Waltenberg and
Vandenberghe (2007) show that not the redistribution of public budgets, but institutional
features are the key in increasing equality of opportunity in schooling.(see also survey of
Betts (2010)). As shown in OECD (2006), school composition is important in explaining
educational achievement. In this paper, we study the causes and eects of social segregation
in a within-country approach.
The study of school tracking is closely related to the study of peer eects. In equilibrium
analyses of among others Epple and Romano (1998), de Bartolome (1990), Benabou (1996),
Nechyba (2000) and Epple et al. (2002), peer group eects are incorporated to study the im-
pact of school vouchers, private-public school sorting and community structure. In empirical
studies however, no consensus is reached on the relation between peer eects and educational
6outcomes (Brunello and Checchi, 2007). This, amongst others, because it is dicult to sepa-
rate peer eects from other confounding eects. To overcome this problem, Hanushek et al.
(2003) control for family background, school settings, student and school-by-grade xed eects
in a longitudinal panel study on a set of pupils in Texas. Hanushek et al. (2003) nd evidence
for a linear relationship between peer group quality and educational outcomes. Consequently,
at an aggregate level, altering peer-group quality by educational tracking is expected to have
no impact on the average education quality, but strong impact on inequality of educational
outcomes. However, exploiting the same student variation in test scores across subjects, Lavy
et al. (2009) nd in a within-pupil regression approach on pupils in secondary education in
England evidence that only the top 5% and bottom 5% students matter to explain individual
variations across subjects. In addition, evidence is found that only academic achievement
matters, not family background and that peer eects are heterogeneous in gender and stu-
dent's ability.
In a recent randomized experiment of Duo et al. (2009) in 121 primary schools in Kenya,
new evidence is found that within-school tracking - separating pupils with dierent abilities
in dierent classes within the same school - is an eective instrument to improve the perfor-
mance of pupils with respectively low and high prior perceived cognitive ability. The random
nature of the experiment is assured by the random attribution of teachers and schools in the
two installed systems (tracking versus non-tracking) and by assigning pupils in two tracks
by initial achievement (bottom halve of class selected into lower track, upper half to higher
track). As both teachers and schools are randomly selected, there are no institutional eects
by assumption. As the eect of school tracking is found to be positive for both pupils in
the low and high tracks, there is no equity-eciency trade-o. However, Guyon et al. (2010)
show that the results of Duo et al. (2009) do hot hold in a between-school tracking setting
in secondary education in developed countries. In a natural experiment, Guyon et al. (2010)
investigate the impact of the 1989 `de-tracking' reform in secondary education in Northern
Ireland with an increase of the relative size of pupils in elite track schools from around 31% to
35%. Information is used from 22 self-constructed areas in Northern Ireland for cohorts be-
tween 1974 and 1982. Discontinuity in educational outcomes is found across cohorts, showing
a positive net-eect of de-tracking. In addition, a positive association between the area-level
change in size of the reform and the area-level educational performance change shows the
robustness of this positive net-eect of de-tracking.
In contrast to the Duo et al. (2009) experiment, a vast literature of cross-country and coun-
try case studies show the detrimental eects of school tracking for equality of opportunity
in education. In Schutz et al. (2008), data from TIMMS and TIMMS-REPEAT is used to
estimate and explain the eect of family background on student performance, using cross-
7country variations. Evidence is found that late tracking and a long pre-school cycle are ben-
ecial for equality of opportunity (EOp) in schooling. Ammerm uller (2005) and Hanushek
and W omann (2006) use PISA and PIRLS data to estimate the eect of institutions on
educational opportunities by applying a dierence-in-dierence approach. Both studies nd
evidence for a negative eect of educational tracking. Ammerm uller (2005) nds in addi-
tion a negative eect of school systems with a large private school sector. However, using
a dierence-in-dierence approach with data from PISA, TIMMS and PIRLS, Waldinger
(2007) shows that the evidence from these cross-country dierence-in-dierence studies on
educational tracking is vulnerable to specication changes.
Using cohort data from 4 datasets, Brunello and Checchi (2007) do nd signicant eects
of educational tracking for educational attainment and early wages. Brunello and Checchi
(2007) thus nd an eect of educational tracking on equality of opportunity in income via
inequality of opportunity in schooling.
In the majority of country case studies - referenced in Brunello and Checchi (2007) - educa-
tional reforms that reduce educational tracking are found to be associated with less impact of
family background on educational attainment. A well-known example is the case of Finland
- where in 1972-1977 a two-track system was progressively replaced with a comprehensive
school system till the age of 16. Pekkarinen et al. (2009) nd in a dierence-in-dierence
approach an increase of intergenerational income mobility as consequence of the reform.
The role of social segregation in explaining the eect of educational tracking on EOp in
schooling is claried by Checchi and Flabbi (2007). They show in a theoretical model of
school-track choice that ability tracking is harmful for EOp in schooling if tracking is based
on family background. If not - and there is full information on ability - ability tracking is
not harmful for EOp in schooling. Put dierently, ability tracking can result in inequality of
opportunity in schooling when the family background determines the track choices, given the
level of ability (Contini et al., 2008).
Using the PISA 2000 and PISA 2003 dataset, Jenkins et al. (2008) nd an association be-
tween social segregation and school choice for a sample of OECD countries. Using pupil
and school-level data from the PISA 2006 dataset, Alegre and Ferrer (2010) nd eect of
social composition of schools on educational performance. By estimating social segregation
at country-level, Alegre and Ferrer (2010) nd association between social segregation and
selection of pupils by schools and into ability tracks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3, we give an overview of
our ltered sample with Flemish data from the PISA 2006 dataset. In section 4, we discuss
8the methodology to estimate and explain inequality of opportunity, and to estimate and
decompose social segregation. In section 5, we present and discuss the results. In section 6
we provide some concluding remarks and discussions.
3 Data
The PISA 2006 dataset is used. In Belgium, education is organized by the Flemish com-
munity, the French-speaking community and the German-speaking community. We focus on
the Flemish community. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is
`an internationally standardized assessment that assesses how far students near the end of
compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for
full participation in society. In all cycles, the domains of reading, mathematical and scientic
literacy are covered not merely in terms of mastery of the school curriculum, but in terms of
important knowledge and skills needed in adult life.'(OECD, 2006)
There are 3 cycles: PISA 2000, PISA 2003 and PISA 2006. In 2006, the survey was imple-
mented in 57 countries. The PISA dataset is characterized by richness on variables related to
educational achievement, family background and school level institutional settings. Although
the main focus of PISA 2006 is on science, each participating pupil is asked to complete a
standardized test on math, science and reading and ll out a survey with questions related to
their family background, views on issues related to science, the environment, careers, learn-
ing time and teaching and learning approaches of science. Each principal of the participating
schools is asked to complete a survey with questions on the characteristics of the school.
Tests are typically constructed to have assessed between 4500 and 10000 students of age 15
in each country. To sample the target population of 15-year old pupils that are at least in
grade 7, PISA 2006 has implemented a two-stage stratied sample design. In a rst-stage,
for each strata5, schools are sampled proportional to size from a list of schools in the region
(PPS sampling). The target was 150 schools in each region. In a second-stage, 35 pupils are
randomly drawn with equal probability from a list of 15-year old pupils in the school.6 Final
student weights are constructed to correct for varying selection probabilities of the students.7
To incorporate sampling variation, a Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) procedure with
80 replication estimates - described in OECD (2005)- can be used to construct standard errors
5A group of schools, formed to improve the precision of sample based estimates.
6If the school size is lower than 35, all pupils are included in the sample.
7This occurs because of certain subgroups that are over- or under-sampled, the information of school size
at the time is not completely correct, school non-response, student non-response and the inclusion of trimming
weight to ensure stable estimates.(OECD, 2009)
9(OECD, 2009). Alternatively, to do statistical inference, bootstrap resampling approaches can
be used8. Both approaches incorporate the nal student weights.
PISA 2006 makes use of a plausible value approach to estimate the pupil performance in
respectively mathematics, science and reading literacy. These plausible values are random
values from the posterior distribution and may not be aggregated at pupil level (OECD,
2005). Therefore, in what follows, we use the rst plausible value to estimate educational
outcomes in math, science and reading at pupil level.
Pupils that are in special education or part-time education are deleted from the sample. By
this, the sample is reduced to 4125 observations in the Flemish community of Belgium. Sub-
schools are dened to investigate the importance of school tracking in general, technical-arts
and vocational education. A sub-school is dened as a unit that provides either general,
technical-arts, or vocational education. When a school provides both general and technical
or arts education (which is relatively rare), then the school is treated as two separate (sub-
)schools.9 The sample consists of 269 Flemish (sub-)schools.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of key variables to study the relation between school track-
ing and educational opportunities. Standardized test scores for math, science and reading
are high in the Flemish community (PISA average is 500). In addition, the high standard
deviation of educational outcomes in the Flemish community shows that there is high in-
equality in individual test scores. To relate inequality in outcomes to family background, we
consider 2 circumstance variables: socio-economic status and migration status. First, fam-
ily socio-economic status is estimated by PISA as a composite index of the Economic and
Socio-Cultural Status (ESCS) of a pupil, derived from (1) the highest occupational status
of each student's parents,(2) their highest educational level, and (3) a summary measure of
household possessions (OECD, 2009). Second, for migration status, three proxies are used.
First-generation immigrants and second-generation immigrants are respectively dened as
pupils that are not born in Belgium and pupils that are born in Belgium, but are children
of immigrants. Pupils that are rst- or second-generation immigrant and do not speak the
school language at home are grouped in a latter category of non-native pupils. Table 1 shows
that there are less than 8 percent immigrant pupils in the sample. As mentioned above, only
35 pupils are sampled in each school. Consequently, a detailed look at segregation between
8In this approach, for a sample of n observations, each bootstrap sample is a random sample of n observations
selected with replacement from the original sample of observations. Consequently, in a bootstrap sample that
is drawn with replacement, some of the n original sample observations are more than once in the bootstrap
sample. Other original sample observations are not in an individual bootstrap sample. By replicating the
bootstrap samples many times, we approximate the true population.
9This is necessary to construct `between school track' and `within school track' social segregation estimates
10migrants (small minority) and non-migrants (large majority) would lead to inaccurate esti-
mates. Therefore, we do not study ethnic segregation in this paper. The focus is thus on
social segregation and equality of opportunity.
In Belgium, secondary education starts in general at age 12 and ends at age 18. In the
Flemish community, pupils in ordinary education are tracked in the rst year of secondary
education in general education, technical education, arts education and vocational education
based on prior achievements. In our ltered sample, around 50 percent of pupils are in
general education (high track), 28 percent are in technical-arts education (middle track) and
20 percent in vocational education (low track).10
If a pupil has not reached the basic skills, determined by the `end goals' in a school year,
grade repetition and re-orientation to lower tracks are used. In our ltered sample, 77 percent
of pupils are `on time'.
In comparison with the French speaking community, the Flemish community is characterized
by early tracking (age 12 versus age 15) and low use of grade repetition (23 percent vs 47
percent ).
Private-granted schools are only a negligible proportion of the school population. There are
mainly public schools (under control of community, provinces, cities or municipalities) and
private operating, public-granted schools (e.g. Catholic schools, non-confessional schools). In
our ltered sample, 74 percent of pupils are in private-operating schools.
<Table 1 about here >
To provide descriptive information on the disproportionate representation of pupils with low
family background in low tracks, we rank pupils in the sample by their ESCS level and the
top and bottom halves are assigned to the low and high social position groups.
Descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that in both communities, pupils with low social
position have signicantly less probability to attend general education (about two times less
likely to attend the high track) and much higher probability to lag behind than pupils with
a high social position (about twice more likely). Only 27 percent of pupils with a low social
position are in general education without lagging behind. For pupils with a high social
position, this is 58 percent. In addition, descriptive statistics indicate greater representation
of pupils with low social position in public schools. In sum, pupils with a low social position
10We merge the technical and arts tracks together because the two tracks do not dominate each other in
curriculum diculty and test scores and because there is only a small proportion of pupils that are in the arts
track.
11have relatively higher probability to lag behind, to be in a lower track or to go in a public
school.
<Table 2 about here >
4 Methodology
4.1 Dening inequality of opportunity
The main focus of the literature on equality of opportunity is on separating sources of inequal-
ity of outcomes that are morally acceptable and morally unacceptable.11 In the seminal book
of Roemer (1998) \equality of opportunity", it is shown that not all inequality of outcomes is
ethically immoral. Only inequality that is outside the realm of individual choice - referred as
circumstances - should be eliminated by public intervention. On the other hand, inequality in
outcomes that is a consequence of factors where individuals are judged to be responsible for -
referred as eort - are morally acceptable and should not be eliminated or compensated for.12
There is a priori no reason to suspect that equality of outcomes and equality of opportunity
goes hand in hand (Lefranc et al., 2008). Typical examples of circumstances are family back-
ground and individual attributes such as race, gender and place of birth. Examples of eort
are own education, annual working hours and migration (Ramos and Van de Gaer, 2009).
EOp is achieved when no particular vector of circumstances is preferred to another vector of
circumstances by all individuals (Lefranc et al., 2008). As shown in Van de gaer (1993), Roe-
mer (1998) and Lefranc et al. (2008), EOp amounts in comparing distributions of outcomes,
conditional on circumstances.
Consider a situation where individuals are allowed to choose their circumstances s - referred
as type - before they know their level of eort. EOp prevails between circumstances s and s0 if
s is not preferred to s0 by all individuals, and vice versa. In other words, agents cannot order
the opportunity sets of s and s0. The opportunity set of an individual can be represented by
the conditional distribution function F(xjs). Under the (weak) assumption that preferences
satisfy the criteria of rst order stochastic dominance (FSD) and second-order stochastic
dominance (SSD), stochastic dominance tests can be used to rank conditional distribution
functions. A formal denition of rst order stochastic dominance (FSD) and second order
stochastic dominance (SSD) is given in respectively (1) and (2).
11Seminal works are among others Arneson (1989), Barry (1991), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981a), Dworkin
(1981b), Roemer (1993), Roemer (1998) and Sen (1980).
12See also Fleurbaey (2008) for detailed account of equality of opportunity.
12Suppose inequality of opportunity where circumstance s is preferred to circumstance s0 by
all individuals. Inequality of opportunity dened as rst order stochastic dominance between
s and s0 means that the distribution of outcome x conditional on s is for all x below the
distribution of x conditional on circumstance s0.
However, it can easily be shown that this is a very weak denition of EOp. Indeed, suppose
a situation where the outcome distribution of type s always dominates the outcome distri-
bution of type s0, except at the top (possibly when they exert maximal eort). Under the
denition of inequality of opportunity as rst order stochastic dominance, EOp is not rejected
in this setting. But it is unfair because type s0 must exert maximal eort to get a chance to
outperform type s.
Second order stochastic dominance provides extra restrictions. Under the denition of in-
equality of opportunity as second order stochastic dominance - under the assumption of a
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function- EOp prevails when the expected value derived
from distribution F(yjs) is not greater than the one derived from F(yjs0).
s FSD s0 i F(xjs)  F(xjs0), 8x 2 <+: (1)






F(yjs0)dy, 8x 2 <+: (2)
4.2 Measuring inequality of opportunity
Econometric stochastic dominance techniques can be used to test FSD and SSD of conditional
distributions. A large advantage of this approach - against among other looking at the
marginal eect of circumstances on the conditional mean of educational outcomes such as
in Schutz et al. (2008)- is that empirical tests have a strong theoretical underpinning13. As
robustness test, we also estimate inequality of opportunity with a Gini-type index. We use
a Gini Opportunity index as proposed by Lefranc et al. (2008). This index is based on the
equivalence between SSD and Lorenz dominance as shown by Shorrocks (1983). The Gini








pipj(j(1   Gj)   i(1   Gi)); (3)
with k types,  the mean of the population, k the mean of group k, pk the population
weight of group k and G the Gini coecient. The GO index computes the sum of all pairwise
dierences of the opportunity sets of all types, where the opportunity sets are dened as twice
13References of papers that use this approach to study equality of opportunity are among others Checchi
and Peragine (2010), Lefranc et al. (2008), Peragine and Serlenga (2008) and Pistolesi (2009).
13the area under Generalized Lorenz curve, s(1   Gs) for type s (Ramos and Van de Gaer,
2009). The GO index is in the interval [0;1]. A value of 0 indicates full EOp. Bootstrapping
can be used to do statistical inference.
4.3 Explaining inequality of opportunity
4.3.1 Conditional mean regression approach
To estimate the eects of school factors and family background on student achievement, a
multilevel regression analysis is carried out where covariates are distributed at two levels: the
students and schools. In an educational setting, unobserved school eects are expected from
school-level disparities in e.g. the academic culture of school sta. As students are clustered
in dierent schools, the assumption of independent noise is violated. It is thus necessary
to include random school eects into the empirical analysis to obtain unbiased estimates
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
The main purpose here is to identify two distinct channels for the impact of family background
on individual educational attainments: a direct eect through the parental socio-economic
status, and an indirect eect through school choice. In addition we will assess how much of the
educational variation across schools can be explained by the school's average social position,
after controlling for the rest of the individual family background and school level variables. As
a result we can examine how and to what extent the social composition of schools (and so the
social segregation between schools) perpetuates indirectly to student achievement inequalities
across schools.
To separate the direct and the indirect school choice eect of parental circumstances on
individual achievement, we follow a regression approach closely related to Bourguignon et al.
(2007). We consider that the educational outcome of an individual (O) is dened as a function
of circumstance variables (C), eort variables (E) and unobserved determinants or random
noise.14 Individual ability is unobserved variable and we do not possess information on ability
scores or earlier academic achievements. To allow for hierarchically clustered noise, we dene
j as the random eect of school j and i as the pupil-level errors. We further relax the
i.i.d. assumption of i by allowing for clustering within strata and by the introduction of
probability weights to correct for unequal selection probabilities as proposed in Pfeermann
et al. (1998).
14Random noise is a combination of the eect of unobserved variables, measurement error and luck. We
follow Lefranc et al. (2009) in dening luck as \random determinants that are seen as a fair source of inequality
provided that they are even-handed". Hence, we do not categorize random noise under eort or circumstances.
14Oij = f(Ci;E(Ci)) + j + i , with i=1,...,n and j=1,...,m. (4)
Circumstances are supposed to have a `direct' eect on outcomes and an `indirect' eect via
`eort' (Bourguignon et al., 2007). The school choice (or track choice) is the only observ-
able `eort' variable we will consider (since other eort variables are not observables). The
school choice is related to circumstances variables. Inequality of opportunity measures the
overall eect of circumstances variables on educational attainments both via the direct eect
of circumstances on educational achievements and the indirect eect through the eect of
circumstances on the eort vairables (school choice). The central feature of this paper is to
include this indirect eect of circumstances on school choice via social segregation. For this,
we include the school's average social position (S). Consequently, if we dene n pupils in m
schools, we obtain a model as dened in (5).
Oij = f(Ci;Sj) + j + i , with i=1,...,n, j=1,..,m. (5)
The non-observable eort variables are captured by the unobserved determinants both at
school levels j and individual level i. We specify a linear econometric model with varying
intercepts as
Oij =j + Ci + i
j = + bSj + j (6)
Where Ci and Sj are covariates at respectively the student and school level, i and j are
independent errors at each level,  is a vector of coecients for the circumstances C and b is
the coecient for the school's average social position S. Substituting the group level equation
into the individual level equation gives the reduced form which can be estimated by maximum
likelihood estimation as:
Oij =  + Ci + bSj + j + i , with i=1,...,n, j=1,..,m. (7)
It is worth noting that estimates can be biased because of standard omitted variable problem
due to the non-observable ability variable, and possible correlation between S and . If there
correlation between ability and the circumstance variables C, then the residual terms are not
orthogonal to the regressors. Therefore, in (7), we make the implicit assumption that (1) the
social position of a pupil is unrelated to his true \ ability" (no genetic transmission of cog-
nitive ability) and (2) that the school's average social position is independent of the random
school eects. To the extent, that we treat ability as non-observable circumstance variables for
which pupils are not responsible, the overall eect of the observable circumstances variables is
15underestimated. Our estimates provide a lower-bound on the overall impact of circumstances
on educational outcomes.
Alternatively, one could think of using instrumental variable approach. However, this strat-
egy is not promising in our educational setting, because it is unlikely to nd a variable that is
correlated to circumstance variables and has no direct eect on educational outcome (Bour-
guignon et al., 2007). Alternatively, following Bourguignon et al. (2007), one could explore
the magnitude of the potential biases by a monte-carlo approach where a wide range of cor-
relations between the residual terms and covariates are explored. However, extension of the
proposed approach from OLS to a two-stage maximum likelihood estimation procedure is not
pursued in this paper. We postpone to the concluding section the discussion of the implication
of the omitted ability variable on our analysis and results.
4.3.2 Conditional quantile regression approach
To obtain a more complete picture of the conditional distribution of pupil performance,
Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduced the estimation of conditional quantiles rather than
the conditional mean.15 Following this method, the conditional th quantile ( 2 (0;1)) is
dened as the test score threshold such that  percent of the pupils of the reference group
perform worse and 1  percent perform better. It is given by the inverse of the conditional
CDF:
q(x) = inffy : F(yjx)  g = F 1(jx): (8)
For example, if y is the pupil test score and x her socio-economic status, 25 % of the pupils
in the same reference group x performs worse than the score threshold q0:25(x = 0). Recently,
Li and Racine (2008) proposed a nonparametric kernel approach to estimate conditional
CDF functions in a multivariate setting with both continuous and discrete variables.16 By
using kernel weights, no a priori parametric assumptions need to be imposed on the quantile
regression. The main features of the Li and Racine (2008) approach in comparison to other
kernel quantile regression approaches are that 1) it admits smoothing of both discrete and
continuous covariates, 2) irrelevant variables are `smoothed out' with high probability via the
data-driven bandwidth selection, 3) also the dependent variable can be smoothed to improve
estimation and 4) optimal bandwidths are selected in an automatic data-driven approach.17 A
15See Koenker (2005) for an overview of parametric quantile regression approaches
16This approach is implemented in the programing software R as package `np' of Hayeld and Racine (2008).
See Li and Racine (2007) for an excellent overview of nonparametric econometrics.
17As recommended in Li and Racine (2008), we use least-squares cross-validation for bandwidth selection.
A second-order Gaussian kernel is used for nonparametric weighting.
16disadvantage of this nonparametric quantile regression approach is that it is - to our knowledge
- not possible to include random school eects.18 The smooth estimate of F(yjx) that allows









Where ^ (x) = n 1 Pn
i=1 Wh(Xi;x) is the kernel estimate of (x). h0 is the smoothing param-
eter associated with y. With generalized product kernel K(Xi;x) = Wh(Xc
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s) and smoothing parameter  2 (0;1). G() is a CDF, e.g. the standard
normal CDF. To obtain the conditional quantile estimate ^ q(x), we minimize the following
objective function:19
^ q(x) = argmin
q j   ^ F(qjx)j: (10)
4.4 Social segregation
Social segregation - that is the uneven distribution of social groups across schools - can be
represented by a segregation curve or as a numerical measure.20 The main drawback of
segregation curves is that only an incomplete or partial ordering is provided. If segregation
curves intersect, the segregation curve approach is silent about which distribution is more
segregated (Hutchens, 2004). Unlike segregation curves, cardinal measures produce complete
rankings. It is shown in Hutchens (2004) that a square root index is the only measure of
segregation that satises seven properties needed for a complete and additive decomposable
ordering.21 We use the Hutchens (2004) square root index to study social segregation in
18Inclusion of xed school eects is not possible in this setting because it would induce an identication prob-
lem between the school level covariate S and the school level xed eects (analogously to the multicollinearity
problem in parametric models).
19An alternative is to use a check function approach as described in Koenker (2005) and Li and Racine
(2007).
20A segregation curve plots the cumulative fraction of type 1 people (vertical axis) and type 2 people
(horizontal axis), both fractions being ranked from low to high values of x1j=x2j, with x1j (and x2j) respectively
the fraction of type 1 (2) in school j (Hutchens, 2004).
21(1) Scale invariance: if N1 and/or N2 are multiplied by a positive scalar and the share of both types in
the S schools remains the same then segregation does not change, with N1 (N2) the number of observations
of type 1 (type 2) in the region in question. (2) Symmetry in groups: measure is unaected if all the people
in group i trade places with those in group j. (3) Movement between groups: for example, if a pupil with
a low social position in a `rich' school moves to a `poor' school, segregation increases. (4) Insensitivity to
proportional divisions. (5) Additive decomposability: the segregation measure can be decomposed in as sum
17education - this is the segregation between socio-economic groups in schooling.
The Hutchens (2004) square root index is dened as the sum, over all schools, of each school's
gap from proportional representation. As formulated in (11), for each school, this gap is the
dierence between the geometric mean of the proportional representation of children from






















with pi the number of children with a low social position in school i = 1;:::;S. Low social
position can be dened as the rst, second or third quartile of ESCS distribution. ri is the
proportion of children with a high social position in school i = 1;:::;S. P and R are the
proportions of children in the population with respectively a low and a high social position.
If the low social position is dened as the rst quartile, then P = 0:25 and R = 0:75. If there
is no segregation, there is proportional representation of each group in each school so that
pi
P = ri
















By the additive decomposability property, (12) can be written as (13). Social segregation
can be decomposed as the sum of between-group segregation (Hbetween) and within-group
segregation (Hwithin).
H = Hwithin + Hbetween ,where Hwithin =
G X
g=1
wgHg, with wg = (Pg=P)0:5(Rg=R)0:5; (13)
with g = 1;:::;G groups, wg the weight of group g, Pg and Rg the number of pupils in group
g with respectively a low and high social position.
As in Jenkins et al. (2008), as robustness check, the results are compared to estimates with the
Duncan and Duncan (1955) dissimilarity index, also called the `displacement index'. In this
setting, the Duncan and Duncan (1955) dissimilarity index measures the fraction of pupils
with low social position that would need to be displaced to `rich' schools, without replacing
them by other children, in order that every school has the same proportions of children with
low and high social background.(Duncan and Duncan, 1955)
of between-group segregation and within-group segregation.(6) Symmetry in types: the segregation measure is
unaected if pupils with a low social position are named group 1 or group 2. (7) Index in interval [0;1], with
















5.1 The Extent of Inequality of Opportunity
In this section, we use a conditional distribution approach to investigate the existence of in-
equality of opportunity in schooling. We study inequality of opportunity in schooling, caused
by socio-economic status (ESCS). The impact of migration status is handled in a multivariate
regression approach in the following subsection. This because ESCS and migration status are
highly related.
Visual inspection of Figure 2 shows that the distribution of pupils in higher ESCS quartile
dominates by FSD the distribution of pupils in lower ESCS quartiles. This indicates that
there exists inequality of opportunity in schooling associated to family background.
Table 3 shows the results from the Gini Opportunity (GO) estimates. In this univariate
analysis, inequality of opportunity between pupils in 4 quartiles of ESCS is studied. For this,
the dependent variable is the rst principal component (FPC) of pupil performance on the
PISA 2006 standardized tests for math, science and reading. Higher values indicate higher
inequality of opportunity in schooling.
In the Flemish community, a Gini Opportunity of 0.016 is found, which is signicantly dier-
ent from zero. Consequently, we nd evidence for a signicant inequality of opportunity in
schooling, caused by ESCS.
The robustness of this result is shown by estimation of EOp between 2 equal quantiles of
pupils and 6 equal quantiles of pupils.22 In addition, to test the sensitivity of the results for
inclusion of migration status, we estimate Gini Opportunity for a sample of native pupils.
<Figure 2 about here >
<Table 3 about here >
5.2 The Impact of Social Segregation on Inequality of Opportunity
5.2.1 The Conditional mean regression
OECD (2006) shows that in Belgium 40.7 percent of the between-school variance in science
22We thus split the groups at respectively the region ESCS median and at ESCS quantiles (1/6 , 1/3, 1/2,
2/3, 5/6).
19performance and 1 percent of the within-school variation are explained by respectively the
ESCS of schools and pupils. In the Flemish community, this is 38.6 and 1.9 percent. The
OECD average is 20.5 and 3.8 percent. In sum, OECD (2006) shows that there are strong
indications that the school ESCS has a large impact on inequality of opportunity in Belgium.
This is in line with Jenkins et al. (2008), where Belgium is ranked as a high social segregation
country. By implementing the Hutchens (2004) square root index on the PISA 2000 and 2003
datasets, Jenkins et al. (2008) show that only Hungary has higher social segregation than
Belgium (H=0.142) in a sample of 30 OECD countries.
However, the eect of school ESCS is underestimated in PISA 2006. In the Flemish commu-
nity, dierent tracks can coexists. Because the peer eects and institutional eects are mainly
inuenced by the situation within a given track, we expect a larger eect if we study the eect
of sub-schools ESCS. For this - as mentioned in section 3 - we treat separately dierent tracks
in the same school as dierent sub-schools.
We extend the PISA 2006 results in two ways. First, we allow for random (sub-)school eects
by estimating a two-level regression model as discussed in section 4. As in OECD (2006),
we choose an additive linear functional form (HLM model). With level 1 the pupil and level
2 the sub-school. Second, instead of investigating pupil performance in science, we proxy
educational outcomes by the standardized rst principal component of math, reading and
science.
Results show rstly, that only 2.87 percent of within-school variation in performance is ex-
plained by ESCS and the proxies for migration status. If only ESCS of the pupils is considered,
this is only 0.43 percent. The signicant coecients and explanatory power of the proxies
of migration status indicate that migration status matters. In the Flemish community, non-
native pupils perform signicantly worse than other native pupils.
Secondly, and more related to the issue of social segregation, the results in Table 4 show
that school ESCS can explain around 60 percent of the between-school variation. Pupils in
a school with many pupils with an unfavorable family background perform on average lower.
The school's average ESCS should not be interpreted as a pure peer eect, but rather as the
eect of social segregation, which includes both peer eects and institutional eects. The large
explanatory power of school ESCS indicates that social segregation with large variation in
school ESCS is a powerful predictor of variation in educational achievements between schools.
We nd a large coecient for school ESCS- respectively 1.70, which implies a 0.75 standard
deviation disparity in educational outcomes between the rst and third quartile school ESCS.
Dierently put, the large coecient of school ESCS indicates large indirect eects of circum-
stances via the (self-)selection of pupils with a low (high) social position in schools where
the social position of pupils is on average low (high). Obviously, it is not possible to say
20whether they perform better because of the positive inuence in the classroom (endogenous
eect) or because they share similar unobserved favorable characteristics (correlated eect)
(see Manski (1993)).23
<Table 4 about here >
5.2.2 The Conditional quantile regression
The nonparametric quantile regression approach brings ner results. In a preliminary regres-
sion, we constructed a model with 1 dependent variable (FPC of math, science and reading),
3 continuous covariates (school ESCS, pupil ESCS and social diversication index) and 3
discrete variables (dummy for rst-generation immigrant, second generation immigrant and
immigrant that does not speak ocial Belgian language at home). The dummies for rst-
generation and second generation immigrants were `smoothed out' and are thus estimated to
be irrelevant. In addition, no (interaction) eects was found for within-school diversication.
Therefore, we re-estimated the nonparametric model with only 2 continuous covariates (ESCS
and school ESCS) and 1 discrete covariate (Language at home). Figure 3 shows that we only
nd a small positive eect of pupil ESCS on the conditional rst quartile output(q0:25), me-
dian output(q0:50) and third quartile output (q0:75). For the school ESCS, profound eects
on pupil performance are found. Figure 4 shows that the three respective conditional quan-
tiles are a clear positive function of school ESCS. The nding of a strong eect of school
ESCS is thus robust for altering the estimation methodology. Figure 6 illustrates further that
the eect of ESCS is almost completely captured by the indirect eect of social segregation
(school ESCS). Only where school ESCS is low and individual ESCS is high - and the data
is thus very sparse- we nd a strong positive direct eect of pupil ESCS. For the language
spoken at home, we nd small, but negative eects (see Figure 5). Thus the nding that
immigration status has an eect besides the eect of ESCS is thus robust for altering the
estimation methodology.
<Figure 3 about here >
<Figure 4 about here >
<Figure 5 about here >
<Figure 6 about here >
23Gender and interaction between individual ESCS and school ESCS were excluded because no signicant
eect was found. Results on the eect of social segregation are robust for altering the denition of school
composition to rst-quartile, median and third quartile school ESCS and for the introduction of social diver-
sication in the model.
215.3 The Impact of tracking on social segregation
Pupils have a low social position if they have ESCS below the median and they are with a
high social position otherwise. In the descriptive statistics, we have shown that pupils with a
low social position are unevenly distributed (1) amongst public and private-operating publicly
funded schools and (2) amongst school tracks (general, technical-arts and vocational). In this
section, we decompose social segregation into school types and into school tracks. For this,
we decompose the Hutchens (2004) square root index as in (14) and (16). This with w the
weight of the given subgroup, Hgroup the within-group Hutchens (2004) square root index of
social segregation and Hbetween the between-group social segregation.
H = wgeneralHgeneral + wtechnical artsHtechnical arts + wvocationalHvocational + Hbetween (15)
H = wpublicHpublic + wprivateHprivate + Hbetween (16)
Table 5 shows that social segregation prevails. A Hutchens (2004) square root index (H) is
found of 0.14 and a Dissimilarity index (D) of 0.39. This latter index is easy to interpret: 39
percent of pupils with low social position need to be displaced from `poor' to `rich' schools-
without replacing them by other children - in order that every school has the same share of
children with low and high social background.
School tracking is found to be a main driver of social segregation. Indeed, between-track
segregation explains 50.89 percent percent of social segregation in schools. Decomposition of
the Hutchens (2004) square root index shows that only 6.56 percent of social segregation can
be explained by school type.
In sum, we nd evidence by decomposition that social segregation is for a large part driven
by school tracking.
As robustness test, we dene dierently pupils into low social positions as those in the rst
quartile ESCS. Results are given in Table 6. We nd similar results with some variation in the
size of the tracking impact on social segregation. The main conclusion that school tracking
is far more important than school type in explaining social segregation is robust. However,
social segregation between school types is now signicantly dierent from zero.
<Table 5 about here >
<Table 6 about here >
226 Concluding remarks and discussions
In this paper we have investigated the importance of school tracking for inequality of oppor-
tunity in education. For this, we used Flemish pupil and school level data from the PISA
2006 dataset. Firstly, we have shown the existence of inequality of opportunity in schooling
by stochastic dominance testing on conditional distributions. We found strong evidence for
inequality of opportunity. Secondly, using a bootstrapped version of the Gini Opportunity
index, evidence was found of the extent of inequality of opportunity in schooling in the Flem-
ish community. Thirdly, we showed in a two-level regression (with school specic eect) that
social segregation is a main driver of inequality of opportunity in schooling in Flanders. Over
60 percent of the variation between schools in educational outcomes can be explained by the
variation in the school social composition. Using a conditional quantile regression approach,
we showed that conditional quantiles are mostly inuenced by the school socio-economic com-
position, with almost no inuence of individual socio-economic status. This result suggests
that the individual school opportunity set depends much more on the school memberships
than on the individual family background. To link tracking to social segregation, we decom-
posed the Hutchens square root index of social segregation between tracks and within tracks.
We nd strong evidence for a crucial role of school tracking in explaining social segregation.
Only 6.56 percent of social segregation can be explained by school type while the between-
track segregation explains 50.89 percent of social segregation in schools. In sum, results show
that school tracking is - via social segregation - detrimental for equality of opportunity in
schooling in Flanders.
Although this paper shows the high association between social segregation, inequality of op-
portunity and school tracking, we cannot really provide a causal relation. The fundamental
reason is that we cannot control for unobserved ability levels. For instance, it could be that
there is no social bias in the track assignment after controlling for the cognitive ability of
the students. Moreover the regression estimates can overestimate the impact of family back-
ground on (average) test scores if (unobserved) cognitive ability is positively correlated to
parental educations. In fact it is now well documented that there is parental transmission of
cognitive ability. See Holmlund et al. (2008), Plug and Vijverberg (2003) and various articles
in Nature magazine. Our response to this genetic transmission issue is threefold. Firstly, it is
fair to say, that there is a risk that this genetic transmission of ability will legitimate social
inequality in education achievements as natural. Secondly, we have been less preoccupied
with the ability transmission in this work because we have concentrated mostly on explaining
average dierences between groups and not between individuals. We have shown that the
social composition of the school is a very powerful predictor of individual test scores. To
23keep this result in perspective, it should be emphasized that average dierences in cognitive
ability between groups are small compared with the range of individual dierence between
groups. Thirdly, the purpose of our analysis was to contribute to the debate on school track-
ing by pointing to its possible societal implications (i.e. social segregation) and ethical issues
(unequal access to knowledge). In this respect, we very much adhere to Judith Harris's con-
clusion in her book `The Nurture Assumption' (1998) `We may not hold their tomorrows in
our hands but we surely hold their todays, and we have the power to make their todays very
miserable'.
7 Tables and Figures
Variable Mean S.E.
Output
PISA 2006 Performance in math, ltered sample (FS) 555.940 (3.054)
PISA 2006 Performance in reading, FS 537.757 (5.644)
PISA 2006 Performance in science, FS 541.023 (2.611))
PISA 2006 Standard deviation of performance in math, FS 89.190 (1.464)
PISA 2006 Standard deviation of performance in reading, FS 92.401 (1.793)
PISA 2006 Standard deviation of performance in science, FS 84.007 (1.372)
Circumstances
Economic and Socio-Cultural Status (ESCS) 0.272 (0.025)
Proportion of rst-generation immigrants 0.030 (0.006)
Proportion of second-generation immigrants 0.026 (0.005)
Imm. that speak non-o. Belgian language at home 0.022 (0.004)
Educational system
School type (public=1, private-operating=0) 0.263 (0.019)
General education 0.479 (0.016)
Technical-arts education 0.325 (0.014)
Vocational education 0.196 (0.012)
Grade 10 0.771 (0.008)
Age of school tracking 12
Number of observations 4125
Table 1: A SAS procedure for a Balanced Repeated Replication procedure with 80 replication es-
timates, described in OECD (2005), is used to construct the mean and standard error.
Standard errors between brackets
24Group Pupils with low social position Pupils with high social position
General education without lagging behind 0.272 0.575
(0.251 , 0.293 ) (0.552 , 0.594)
General education 0.313 0.643
(0.293 , 0.334) ( 0.621 , 0.664)
Technical or arts education 0.392 0.273
(0.356 , 0.397) (0.256 , 0.294)
Vocational education 0.310 0.085
(0.289 , 0.330) (0.071 , 0.096)
Lagging behind 0.283 0.160
(0.262 , 0.304 ) (0.143 , 0.177)
Public school 0.321 0.207
(0.298 , 0.341) (0.190 , 0.225)
Table 2: Bootstrap approach with 999 replications and 95% basic condence intervals between brack-
ets, package `boot' in R















































Figure 2: Conditional distribution of pupil achievement
25Variable Estimates
Gini opportunity (GO) 100 - 4 groups 1.647
(1.522 , 1.832)
Gini opportunity (GO) 100 - 2 groups 1.270
(1.152 , 1.416)
Gini opportunity (GO) 100 - 6 groups 1.693
(1.545 , 1.843)
Gini opportunity (GO) 100 - 4 groups - native pupils 1.560
(1.413 , 1.709)
Table 3: Bootstrapping with replacement, 999 replications, package `boot' in R, 95 % basic condence
intervals between brackets
26Variable Model I Model II
ESCS of pupil 0.121 0.102
(0.026) (0.024)






Immigrant that does not speak ocial




Log likelihood -5966.299 -5919.216
Between-sub-school variation explained 59.532% 59.100%
Within-sub-school variation explained 0.428 % 2.869%
Number of level 1 units 4125 4125
Number of level 2 units 269 269
Signicance levels :  : 5%  : 1%    : 0.1%
Table 4: Dependent variable: rst principal component of rst plausible value of test scores reading,
math and science. Standard errors between brackets. The model, estimated in STATA with
GLLAMM, is a two-level model with level 1 the pupils and level 2 the sub-schools. We allow
for clustering within strata. Final student weights are introduced as probability weights as
proposed in Pfeermann et al. (1998). To obtain between- and within-sub-school variation
explained, we compare the model with only a constant with the model with explanatory
variables, as suggested in OECD (2009).
27Figure 3: Condtional quantile estimates: eect ESCS
Figure 4: Conditional quantile estimates: eect school ESCS
28Figure 5: Conditional quantile estimates: eect language at home
Figure 6: Conditional quantile surface: eect ESCS and school ESCS on median output
29Segregation index Estimates
Square root index (H) 0.135
(0.115 , 0.158)
Dissimilarity index (D) 0.389
(0.358 , 0.425)
In general education (Hgeneral) 0.060
(0.044 , 0.077)
In technical-arts education (Htechnical-arts) 0.051
(0.038 , 0.064)
In vocational education (Hvocational) 0.144
(0.098 , 0.192)
Within track segregation (Hwithin) 0.066
(0.055 , 0.080)
Between track segregation (Hbetween) 0.069
(0.051 , 0.085)
Within track segregation (Hwithin as % of H) 49.1 %
(42.2 , 56.5)
Between-track segregation(Hbetween as % of H) 50.887 %
(43.5 , 57.8)
In public schools (Hpublic) 0.147
(0.106 , 0.192)
In private-operating schools (Hprivate) 0.121
(0.097 , 0.146)
Within school type segregation (Hwithin) 0.127
(0.107 , 0.148)
Between school type segregation (Hbetween) 0.009
(-0.001 , 0.014)
Within school type segregation (Hwithin as % of H) 93.4 %
(89.4 , 100.5)
Between school type segregation(Hbetween as % of H) 6.6 %
(-0.5 , 10.6)
Sample of sub-schools 269
Sample of pupils 4125
Table 5: Bootstrapping with replacement, 999 replications, package `boot' in R. 95% basic condence
intervals between brackets
30Segregation index Estimates
Square root index (H) 0.168
(0.139 , 0.200)
Dissimilarity index (D) 0.413
(0.377 , 0.453)
In general education (Hgeneral) 0.159
(0.111 , 0.210)
In technical-arts education (Htechnical-arts) 0.075
(0.053 , 0.095)
In vocational education (Hvocational) 0.105
(0.065 , 0.143)
Within track segregation (Hwithin) 0.109
(0.090 , 0.132)
Between track segregation (Hbetween) 0.059
(0.039 , 0.075)
Within track segregation (Hwithin as % of H) 65.0 %
(57.8 , 73.8)
Between-track segregation(Hbetween as % of H) 35.0 %
(26.2 , 42.2)
In public schools (Hpublic) 0.145
(0.086 , 0.195)
In private-operating schools (Hprivate) 0.160
(0.128 , 0.197)
Within school type segregation (Hwithin) 0.154
(0.124 , 0.181)
Between school type segregation (Hbetween) 0.014
(0.003 , 0.024)
Within school type segregation (Hwithin as % of H) 91.4 %
(86.0 , 97.9)
Between school type segregation(Hbetween as % of H) 8.6 %
(2.1 , 14.0)
Sample of sub-schools 269
Sample of pupils 4125
Table 6: Pupils with low social position are dened as pupils with an ESCS score below the rst
quartile of ESCS in the region. Bootstrapping with replacement, 999 replications, package
`boot' in R. 95% basic condence intervals between brackets
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